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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses and compares the roles which Belgium and Italy have played in the 
process of European monetary integration. It discusses Belgian and Italian attitudes 
towards European integration and EMU, exchange rate policies, key concepts of the 
Belgian and Italian EMU strategies and the concrete contributions made by Belgium and 
Italy.  Overall, these two countries played an important and pace-setting role in the process 
of European monetary integration.  They developed several creative and diplomatic 
proposals.  Moreover, Belgian and Italian policy-makers often acted as "policy 
entrepreneurs" and proved to be skilful negotiators.  The main difference is that Belgium 
has been a  constant and consistent "pace-setter" in monetary matters, from the 
preparation of the Hague Summit to the elaboration of the EMS, the monetary chapter in 
the Single European Act and the realisation of EMU, whereas Italy was mainly active in the 
1980s.  This assessment of the Belgian and Italian contributions does not challenge the 
decisive impact of the Franco-German axis, but illustrates that EMU was a multilateral 
process.  Furthermore, the paper shows how important it was for a country to achieve a 
sound economic performance, especially a stable exchange rate, in order to have 
influence on the European monetary scene. 
 
JEL codes: A11, B20, E58, F02, P16. 
Key words: European monetary integration, Belgium, Italy. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper will analyse the role which Belgium and Italy have played in the process of 
European monetary integration. Belgium and Italy were both founding members of the 
European Communities and shared a pronounced pro-European attitude.  
 
Of course, France and Germany have been the dominant players in the EMU process
1.  
However, by highlighting the contributions of Belgium and Italy, this article reinforces and 
illustrates the fact that EMU was a collective, multilateral achievement. Belgium and Italy, 
through creative proposals and diplomatic efforts, played an active and pace-setting role in 
the process of European monetary integration
2.  The main difference is that Belgium 
played this pace-setting role throughout the EMU process, whereas Italy was mainly 
involved in the 1980s. 
 
Generally speaking, one has to admit that it is difficult to assess a country’s influence in 
the European Union system.  An important reason is that consensus building is pervasive 
in European decision-making, so that cooperative moves are the typical procedure. This 
makes it difficult to isolate individual contributions. Moreover, Member States often exert 
power in indirect ways. It is therefore not easy to assess a country’s influence.  This paper 
will  focus on the participation of Belgium and Italy in the European exchange rate 
arrangements, and to their views on and contributions to European monetary integration, 
crucial determinants of influence in the EMU process
3. 
 
The paper starts with an analysis of Belgian and Italian attitudes towards European 
integration and EMU. It then moves on to their exchange rate policies.  Finally, it analyses 
the key concepts of both countries for the creation of EMU and their contributions to the 
European monetary integration process. 
 
This paper draws on earlier research in which the authors were involved, both on the 
process of European monetary integration in general (see Smets, Maes and Michielsen, 
2000 and Maes, 2002a and b) as well as, more specifically, on the Belgian and Italian 
approaches towards EMU (see Smets, Michielsen and Maes, 2002 and Quaglia, 2002).  
                                                          
1   Overviews of the process of European monetary integration can be found in Dyson & Featherstone, 1999, Gros & 
Thygesen, 1998, Issing, 1996, Papadia & Saccomanni, 1994, Szàsz, 1999 and van Ypersele & Koeune, 1989. 
2   See Börzel (2000) for an analysis of the concept of pace-setting. 
3   Wallace (2001) distinguishes seven sources of influence in EU decision making: political weight, political practice, 
economic weight, social and economic practice, persuasive ideas, compelling demands, and credibility and consistency.  
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The research is based on a variety of sources including primary documents, a review of 
the secondary literature, archival sources and a large-scale programme of interviews.  
Official positions are the main focus, although the ideas of certain influential Belgians and 
Italians are sometimes presented
4.  The paper  considers the period from the Hague 
Summit of December 1969, when EMU was put on the agenda, to the selection of the 
participants in 1998. 
 
 
                                                          
4   A complicating factor is that individuals move between national and European institutions, especially the Commission.  
Also, national officials are often members of European committees and study groups.  Furthermore, even the issue of 
what is an official position is not entirely clear (see Wallace, 2001, who focuses on governments).  In this paper "official 
positions" refer mostly to governments (especially the ministry of finance), but also to central banks.  
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2.  ATTITUDES TOWARDS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND EMU 
2.1  Belgium 
There has been a very high degree of consensus in Belgium in favour of European 
integration.  EMU was an important objective of Belgium’s European policy, being an 
essential element of political integration (Franck, 1998: 207).  This fundamental consensus 
in favour of European integration and EMU was based on the structural characteristics of 
Belgium as a small open economy, its geographic location and fundamental attitudes in 
favour of European integration, strongly marked by the experience of the two world wars. 
The consensus involved the main political parties and key social players (trade unions, 
employers' organisations, etc. ..).  Moreover, the Christian Democrats, the dominating 
force in the political landscape in the post-war period, identified themselves strongly with 
European unification.  As Mark Eyskens, a former Prime Minister, pointed out: "Europe is 
like a fatherland to be loved" (Beyers and Kerremans, 2001, 16)
 5. 
 
For Belgium, as a medium-sized country, European integration implied a gain in influence.  
European integration instituted the rule of European law, limiting the power of the larger 
countries. Also, new supranational players, such as the Commission and the Court, were 
set up, further constraining the power of the larger countries. 
 
In this institutional context, Belgium and the Commission were usually natural allies, 
sharing the same fundamental aim of a more federal Europe. Also, as the Commission 
was based in Brussels, informal contacts were easy.  Moreover, the Member of the 
Commission in charge of Monetary Matters has typically been French, further favouring 
contacts with the Belgian authorities
6. 
 
2.2  Italy 
In general, Italian attitudes towards European integration were more complex than the 
Belgian stance: there was less consensus and positions shifted over time.  However, for 
most of the period covered by this paper, Italian political, economic and cultural elites, as 
well as public opinion, supported the process of European integration.  Italian governments 
 
                                                          
5   The Christian Democrats (and the church) have typically taken a "universalist" approach (in contrast  to a  more 
"nationalist" approach). 
6   Thus, at the end of the 1960s, there were good contacts between Barre and Snoy, the Belgian Finance Minister.  They 
even exchanged their initial proposals for the Hague Summit on a confidential and personal basis.  (Archives Snoy, 
Maps 5.3.12.4 and 5.3.12.8.1).  Delors and Maystadt also had a good relationship (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 707).  
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have traditionally been among the most pro-European and most in favour of transferring 
sovereignty to the European level.  An important role was played by the Christian 
Democrats, who dominated the political scene until the 1992 general elections and who 
were very pro-European.  Moreover, among other parties of the governing coalitions, 
especially the small but influential Republican Party, there was a very strong pro-European 
attitude
7.  The European "vocation" was also the prevailing ethos of Italian diplomacy, 
which emphasised that Italy h ad to remain at the core of the process of European 
integration.  Membership of the European Communities was seen as a way to rehabilitate 
Italy in the international community after 1945 and as a way to anchor democracy and 
freedom in a wider  European  framework,  especially  in view of  a potential communist 
threat.  Also, the more enlightened and outward-oriented elements of the Italian elite 
regarded it as a way to develop the Italian economy and to modernise the country.  It was 
a route to bring about domestic reforms, a "vincolo esterno" (Sbragia, 2001; Quaglia, 
2002).  
 
Initially, the socialist party (PSI) was cautious about European integration but it became 
more pro-European,  especially after the Soviet  clamp-down in Budapest in 1956.  
Moreover, until the early 1970s, the Italian Communist Party (PCI), which was supported 
by up to one third of the electorate, opposed European integration and Italian membership 
of the EEC (Vannicelli, 1974).  This position shifted during the 1970s, when the PCI took a 
more independent view of international relations with the development of "Euro-
communist" ideas, and also moved closer to the government with the so-called "historic 
compromise"
8.  So Italy’s European policy became bipartisan, at least up to a point
9.   
 
European monetary integration was a topic of heated discussions in Italy.  The foreign 
policy establishment was typically pro, while economic policy-makers tended to be more 
divided
10. 
                                                          
7   The republican movement in Italy was strongly influenced by the French revolution, giving it a "universalist" orientation. 
8   The PCI and the PSI voted against the treaty on the European Coal and Steel Communities.  The PCI voted also against 
the EEC Treaty, while the PSI abstained. 
9  A word of caution is required.  For example, in 1978 the PCI voted against Italy’s joining of the EMS and the Socialist 
Party abstained. In 1992 the "Reconstructed Communists" and the Italian Social Movement voted against the ratification 
of the Treaty on European Union.  The experience of the first and second Berlusconi government in 1994 and 2001 has 
also raised questions about this bipartisan approach as well as about Italy’s traditional support for European integration.  
It is also worth noting that, in the early years of the EEC, certain sectors of the business community were against Italian 
membership (Carli, 1993). 
10   Even if Luigi Einaudi had already come out in favour of a single European currency in the early 1940s.  
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At the time of the Hague Summit and the Werner Report, Emilio Colombo, initially the 
Finance Minister and thereafter the Prime Minister, took a positive approach towards the 
EMU project, while Carli, the Governor of the Banco d'Italia, was more cautious.  In 1972, 
Italy joined the so-called "Snake", mainly for (geo)political reasons and despite 
disagreements amongst Italian policy-makers.  However, with a worsening inflation and 
balance of payments situation, the lira had to withdraw in early 1973.  
 
A crucial moment, and a watershed choice in Italian policymaking towards European 
monetary integration, was the decision to join the EMS (Spaventa, 1990, 17).  Political 
leadership and a clear political view that Italy should be at the inner circle of Europe were  
the key factors that tipped the balance in favour of membership.  Interestingly, the EMS 
was regarded in the debate as a proxy for "Europe" and "European integration". 
Membership of the EMS was mainly discussed in  (geo)political terms, and less on the 
basis  of economic considerations.  Technical policy-makers, such as the Bank of Italy and 
many Italian economic experts, were reluctant to join the system.  Also, views diverged 
within the government.  The "pessimistic" view was supported by, among others, the 
Minister for Foreign Trade, Rinaldo Ossola, a former Director-General of the Bank of Italy. 
Ossola (1978) maintained that the EMS entailed fundamental problems for Italy.  He 
believed that it would be merely a second version of the "Snake". Moreover, at the 
domestic level, Ossola doubted that the political parties and the social partners had the 
necessary commitment and cohesion to adopt the tough economic policy required to 
remain in the EMS.  This line of thought was shared by the governor of the Bank of Italy, 
Paolo Baffi, and by other members of the government
11.  In contrast, the "optimistic" view, 
embodied by the Treasury Minister, Filippo Pandolfi, favoured Italy's joining the system, 
also on the grounds that EMS membership would support his economic adjustment plan
12.  
The Italian government, with Andreotti as prime minister, after a week’s pause for 
reflection, decided to join the ERM, but with a wider fluctuation band of 6 pct.  
 
During the 1980s Italy played more and more a pace-setting role in the EMU process, with 
the Rome European Councils of 1990 as a high point.  After the withdrawal from the ERM 
 
                                                          
11  For "economic" reasons relating to the sustainability of Italy's participation, Baffi was clearly sceptical about joining the 
ERM, as he was a convinced pro-European and a member of the European Movement. 
12  In 1978 Pandolfi submitted a plan entitled "A proposal for development, a choice for Europe".  Several Italian economists 
played a part in drafting the document.  The main contribution came from Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, who was 
seconded from the Banca d'Italia for two months.  There were further contributions by Luigi Spaventa, Mario Monti and 
Paolo Baffi, the Governor of the Banca d'Italia.  The Pandolfi Plan shows a shift in the reference framework for Italian 
economic policy-making, as it originated partly from IMF demands (related to a large IMF loan), while it was to become 
an important argument supporting Italy’s commitment during the EMS negotiations.  
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in September 1992, however, Italy took a low profile in EMU matters.  In the run-up to 
EMU, the Italian decision to attempt first-wave membership against the odds was the result 
of political brinkmanship and a strong political view that Italy had to remain at the inner 
circle of Europe.   
 
2.3  Comparison 
Several similarities may be discerned between the Belgian and the Italian attitudes 
towards European integration.  Firstly, both countries were founding members of the EEC, 
and pro-European attitudes have traditionally been displayed by public opinion as well as 
by the political, economic and cultural elites.  Secondly, both countries were characterised, 
be it to different degrees, by social and political divisions, weak governments and 
fragmented political party systems, contributing to significant budget deficits
13.  For 
policy-makers in both countries, European integration was a way to counterbalance 
centrifugal tendencies and to "anchor" national macroeconomic policies in a  European 
framework. 
 
The main difference, as far as European monetary integration is concerned, was that in 
Italy the pro-integration coalition was more fragmented and unstable than in Belgium.  The 
Belgian approach was more or less unconditional, despite  the economic and political 
situation.  Belgium was a member of the Snake.  It joined the EMS from the very beginning 
and remained within the Exchange Rate Mechanism throughout the 1990s.  It also 
continuously played a pace-setting role in the process of European monetary integration. 
In contrast, the Italian approach changed over time and was highly influenced by the 
economic and political circumstances.  Overall, for only about half of the period under 
consideration did Italy participate in the European exchange rate arrangements.  Its main 
contributions in the EMU process were in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
 
 
                                                          
13  In both countries the central bank played also a significant role in economic policymaking.  This was most evident in Italy 
where several senior central bankers became leading politicians.  In Belgium the central bank influence was more behind 
the scenes.  
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3.   EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES 
The Belgian and Italian economies were, to a certain degree, plagued by the same 
problems of inflation and budget deficits.  However, for most of the period under 
consideration, there was a significant difference regarding the role of the exchange rate in 
the macroeconomic strategies, with Belgium following a stable exchange rate policy, while 
the Italian lira, for most of  the period under consideration, did not participate in the 
European exchange rate mechanisms.  
 
3.1  Belgium 
During the whole period under consideration, Belgium participated in the European 
exchange rate arrangements, initially the Snake and later the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
of the EMS
14.  Belgium basically followed a stable exchange rate policy, with the exchange 
rate constituting a "vincolo esterno" for the Belgian economy (cf. Chart 1).  Naturally, there 
have been shifts of emphasis in the Belgian exchange rate policy.  So, in the early 1980s, 
a "stable" exchange rate was interpreted as a middle position in the EMS, while later the 
Belgian franc was "anchored" to the German mark.   
 
 
                                                          
14  When the Bretton Woods system broke down, on 21 August 1971, Belgium even concluded a special agreement with the 
Netherlands to limit the fluctuation margin between the guilder and the franc to 1.5 per cent.  This formed the only fixed 
but adjustable parity mechanism in the EC until the launching of the snake in April 1972.  
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Chart 1 - Nominal exchange rate of the Belgian franc and the Italian lira against the German 
mark 
 
(logarithmic scales, 1970 = 100) 
 
 
 
Source: NBB. 
 
 
There were two crisis moments in the Belgian exchange rate policy: the early 1980s and 
the ERM crisis of 1993.  The fundamental desequilibria in the early 1980s obliged the 
Belgian authorities to devalue the franc (cf. Chart 2).  However, it is important to remark 
that the 1982 devaluation of the Belgian franc was conceived as a "never again" operation.  
During the ERM crisis the Belgian authorities successfully defended the exchange rate.  
 
Overall, European exchange rate arrangements and EMU have been used by Belgian 
policy-makers as major arguments for the adoption and implementation of reforms.  These 
were especially necessary to  rectify the severe imbalances that had emerged in the 
Belgian economy in the late seventies and early eighties.  While these measures were vital 
for the future of the Belgian economy and society at large, their European justification has 
been instrumental in gathering the necessary political support.  
ff  
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Chart 2 - Economic indicators for Belgium, Italy and Germany 
 
 
 
Source: CEC.  
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The situation in Belgium was most serious at the beginning of the 1980s, when the Belgian 
economy hit rock-bottom: in 1981 the government budget deficit amounted to 16 pct. of 
GDP and the current account deficit to 4 pct. of GDP. 
 
In 1982, under a new Christian Democratic-Liberal government, there was a  radical 
reorientation of economic policy.  At the core was a devaluation of the Belgian franc by 
8.5 pct., a cut in real wages (with temporary suspension of the wage indexation 
mechanism), and, in a later phase, a budgetary tightening.  This led to an improvement in 
the economic fundamentals, which enabled the Belgian authorities to pursue a gradually 
more ambitious exchange rate policy (Lamfalussy, 2000). 
 
During realignment discussions in the mid-1980s Belgian policy-makers would only 
consent to ever smaller depreciations against the German mark (cf. Table 1).  In January 
1987, the position of the Belgian franc was the issue of rather bitter European discussions, 
as Belgium insisted on maintaining parity against the German mark, while France did not 
want to be isolated in depreciating against the German mark.  Moreover, the Belgian 
authorities gradually also moved towards a strategy of keeping the Belgian franc well 
within the band and closer to the German mark, especially in order to influence market 
sentiment (Godeaux, 1989).  This progressive strengthening of the exchange rate policy 
culminated in the Belgian authorities’ decision, in June 1990, to peg the Belgian franc 
formally to the German mark.  
 
 
Table 1 - An overview of the functioning of the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS 
 
(from the start to January 1987, normal fluctuation margins of 2.25%) 
 
Date  DEM  NLG  FRF  DKK  BEF/LUF  IEP  ITL
1 
24.09.1979  +2.0      -2.9       
30.11.1979        -4.8       
23.03.1981              -6.0 
05.10.1981  +5.5  +5.5  -3.0        -3.0 
23.02.1982        -3.0  -8.5     
14.06.1982  +4.25  +4.25  -5.75        -2.75 
21.03.1983  +5.5  +3.5  -2.5  +2.5  +1.5  -3.5  -2.5 
22.07.1985  +2.0  +2.0  +2.0  +2.0  +2.0  +2.0  -6.0 
06.04.1986  +3.0  +3.0  -3.0  +1.0  +1.0     
04.08.1986            -8.0   
12.01.1987  +3.0  +3.0      +2.0     
 
1  Fluctuation margin of 6%.  
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This exchange rate policy, with the Belgian franc anchored to the German mark, was also 
at the heart of the Belgian strategy to qualify for EMU.  With this policy, and supporting 
budgetary and income policies, the price stability and long-term interest rate criteria would 
be attained without serious problems.  The budgetary criterion remained Belgium's 
Achilles' heel (Brouhns, 1992).  
 
The ERM crisis of 1993, when the Belgian franc also came under strong speculative 
pressure, struck at the core of the Belgian strategy.  The storm on the foreign exchange 
market reached its height in October 1993, when the Belgian franc was quoted 7  pct. 
below its central rate against the mark. 
 
The National Bank of Belgium strongly defended the exchange rate, applying all possible 
means.  It increased the official rate from 6.7 pct. at the beginning of July to 10.5 pct. at the 
beginning of September.  The Bank also intervened in the foreign exchange markets on a 
massive scale (to the tune  of over 580 billion Belgian francs, or more than 8.5 pct. of 
GDP).  In addition, the Belgian government relaunched its policies of budgetary restriction 
and wage moderation with the adoption of the "Global Plan for Employment, 
Competitiveness and Social Security", in November 1993.  The plan modified the wage 
indexation mechanism, with the introduction of the so-called "health index".  It also 
comprised budgetary measures totalling about 1 per cent of GDP
15.  The Belgian franc 
recovered and returned to  its central parity against the German mark in January 1994. 
 
3.2  Italy 
 
The history of Italy’s participation in European exchange rate mechanisms was rather 
eventful (cf. Table 2).  Italy participated in the creation of the snake in April 1972, but the 
Italian lira soon withdrew in February 1973.  The lira also joined in the ERM from the start 
in March 1979, but with a special fluctuation margin of 6 %.  In January 1990 Italy entered 
the normal fluctuation margin of 2.25%.  In September 1992, with the ERM crisis, the lira 
left the ERM, re-entering in November 1996.   
 
In those circumstances it is no surprise that the role of the exchange rate as an instrument 
 
                                                          
15   This may not look very much, but Belgium basically followed a strategy of gradual budgetary adjustment, which had also 
started earlier than in Italy (cf. Cabral, 1996).   
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of economic policy has been a topic of intense discussions among policy-makers in Italy
16.   
 
A basic problem in Italy were the frequent divergences and inconsistencies between the 
various macroeconomic policies: fiscal policy, monetary and exchange rate p olicy and 
incomes policy (cf. Onofri and Tomasini, 1992 and Rossi, 1998).  
 
 
Table 2 - Italian participation in the European exchange rate mechanisms 
 
April 1972  Creation of the snake: Italy participates 
February 1973  Italian lira leaves the snake 
March 1979  Creation of the EMS: lira enters the ERM with a special fluctuation margin 
of 6% 
January 1990  Fluctuation margin of the Italian lira is reduced from 6 to 2.25% 
September 1992  Italian lira leaves the ERM 
November 1996  Italian lira re-enters the ERM 
 
 
Moreover, Italy's economic situation was evolving.  In the second half of the 1960s the 
Italian lira was regarded as a strong currency.  In 1969, the Italian authorities considered 
revaluing the Italian lira, together with the German mark.  However, with the "hot autumn of 
1969", the social and political climate changed in Italy,  and  more so than in other 
countries
17. This contributed to inflationary pressures and a chronically weak balance of 
payments, undermining the Italian lira.  
 
In the 1970s, the Italian authorities responded to the oil shock by letting inflation go up and 
allowing the exchange rate to depreciate (Giavazzi and Spaventa 1989).  The weakening 
of the lira surpassed the inflation differentials, thus leading to a depreciation of the lira in 
real terms (cf. Chart 3). 
 
In 1978, when the EMS and Italy's participation came on the agenda, the discussion 
heated up.  While accepting that this was a political decision, senior policy-makers at the 
Bank of Italy, as well as many Italian economists, maintained that the ERM needed some 
"in-built flexibility" and had to be "realistic" (Masera, 1987a, Baffi, 1989).  It was intended to 
attain an exchange rate system that could be adapted to Italy’s "special conditions" and 
would contribute to the "convergence" of the Italian economy without imposing intolerable 
burdens.  Indeed, senior policy-makers at the Banca d'Italia feared that the exchange rate 
                                                          
16   For an overview of the debates on money and credit in Italy, see Nardozzi, 1993. 
17   The changes in Italy were not only more extensive and pervasive than in other countries (e.g. terrorism), but also lasted 
much longer (Allum, 2000, 27).  
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system would not be supported by sufficiently convergent economic policies.  If so, the lira 
would have to leave the ERM, as happened with the snake.  This could constitute a threat 
to the credibility of the Banca d'Italia.  So Baffi publicly stated that, the "fundamentals are 
too divergent and, therefore, the EMS cannot enjoy credibility" ( Repubblica, 7  October 
1978). Furthermore, in explaining his position on Italy’s membership of the EMS, Baffi 
used to point out how unsettled the Italian situation was, often reminding his colleagues 
that "there are the Red Brigades out there"
18.   
 
Chart 3 - Real effective exchange rates of the Belgian franc, the Italian lira and the German 
mark 
 
(on the basis of the index of consumer prices, index 1970 = 100, against 26 countries) 
 
 
 
Source: BIS. 
 
 
With the participation in the EMS in 1979, and under the governorship of Ciampi, a major 
shift in Italian exchange rate policy and monetary strategy occurred.  This was further 
supported by changes in the domestic monetary policy framework which strengthened the 
                                                          
18   Moreover, several policy-makers, also at the Banca d'Italia, hoped that Great Britain would join, so that the lira would be 
less isolated.  
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position of the Banca d'Italia
19.  From the first half of the 1980s the realignments of the lira 
never fully compensated for the inflation differentials between Italy and the low-inflation 
countries within the ERM (Bini-Smaghi and Vona, 1988). Furthermore, from 1987 to 1992 
no realignments took place.  This led to an appreciation of the lira in real terms, reversing 
the exchange rate policy of the 1970s (Gaiotti and Rossi, 2003).  The so-called "strong" 
exchange rate policy consisted in deploying the exchange rate as an "external constraint" 
in the domestic arena, where it was used to fight inflation by disciplining the trade unions 
and promoting industrial restructuring.  It was also intended to obtain a more restrictive 
fiscal policy.  
 
After the  agreement on the  Maastricht Treaty, the Italian authorities took significant 
measures to combat inflation and to improve the budgetary situation.  In July 1992, the 
Amato government succeeded in completely abolishing the wage indexation mechanism 
(Sarcinelli, 1995, 401).  As for fiscal policy, the initial budget, presented in June 1992, 
included significant measures, amounting to nearly 2 pct. of GDP.   
 
The picture changed dramatically with the withdrawal of the lira from the ERM in 
September 1992.  However, five days after the lira’s exit from the ERM, even more drastic 
steps were taken, with budgetary measures amounting to 5.8 pct. of GDP.  Thereafter, the 
budgetary adjustment process subsided.  
 
The withdrawal of the lira from the ERM in September 1992, very much like Italy’s exit from 
the snake in early 1973, constituted a major setback for Italy’s policy towards EMU.  It 
reversed the exchange rate policy followed by the Italian authorities during the 1980s.  Yet, 
despite the sharp depreciation of the lira, inflationary performance and inflationary 
expectations improved, owing to the anti-inflationary incomes policy introduced since 1992 
(Baldassarri et al., 1996).  
 
The floating of the lira became an important element of the Italian strategy after 1992.  It 
fostered an export-led boom which, in turn, sustained Italian economic growth in a phase 
of fiscal retrenchment and slow growth in the European Union.  Yet, this choice was made 
for a variety of reasons, one being the lukewarm attitude of some countries towards the 
lira’s re-entry into the ERM.  
                                                          
19   For instance, in 1981 the Bank of Italy was freed from the obligation to buy unsold Treasury bonds. It was the so-called 
"divorce" between the central bank and the Treasury.  This increased the autonomy of the Bank in the conduct of 
monetary and exchange rate policy.  For an overview of the development of the institutional framework of Italian 
monetary policy, see Passacantando (1996).   
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The lira re-entered the ERM in November 1996, which was  essential to  fulfil the 
convergence criteria.  There were intense discussions on the new parity of the lira, in 
which Ciampi, then finance minister, and Tietmeyer played a leading role.  
 
3.3  Comparison 
Belgium and Italy shared several economic weaknesses, be it to different degrees.  During 
the 1970s and 1980s, Belgium and Italy were two of the countries with the most 
pronounced wage indexation mechanisms, making the economies prone to wage-price 
spirals.  In the early 1990s, in both Italy and Belgium, the wage indexation mechanisms 
were dismantled or modified.  Belgium and Italy also had a tradition  of weak public 
finances.  As regards politics, for most of the period under consideration, both countries 
had systems of proportional representation. This contributed to a more fragmented political 
party system, coalition governments and government instability, an important factor behind 
the chronic budget deficits (cf. Annex 1). 
 
For most of the period under consideration, however, the exchange rate played a very 
different role in macroeconomic policy in Belgium, compared to Italy.  Throughout the 
whole period, Belgium participated in the European exchange rate arrangements and 
basically followed a stable exchange rate policy.  At the beginning of the 1980s, when the 
competitive position of the Belgian economy had become unsustainable, the Belgian 
authorities decided on a once and for all devaluation backed by accompanying policies.  
Italy only participated in European exchange rate arrangements for about half of the period 
under consideration.  These differences in the degree of participation in European 
exchange rate arrangements can be explained by wide variations in  economic 
performance, especially in terms of inflation (cf. Chart 1).  
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4.  KEY CONCEPTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
This section will pay attention to the basic vision of Belgium and Italy on EMU and the way 
of achieving it, as well as to the main concrete contributions in the EMU process
20. 
 
 
4.1  Belgium 
In regard to European monetary integration, Belgium has been a "consistent demandeur" 
and has played a pace-setting role.  As in many other areas, it was usually  a close ally of 
the European Commission.  One of its constant concerns was to keep  EMU on the 
agenda. 
 
4.1.1  A supranational and symmetric EMU 
The basic blueprint of the Belgian vision of the structure and functioning of EMU can be 
found in the Belgian plan for EMU of January 1970: "A three-stage plan for European 
monetary solidarity: 1971-1977”
21. 
 
The ultimate aim, as adopted at the Hague Summit of December 1969, was the creation of 
a "European monetary community".  For this, two conditions had to be fulfilled: the 
unification of economic policies and a certain homogeneity of the economies of the 
Member States.  This homogeneity referred not only to a degree of institutional 
homogeneity, but also to an absence of marked differences in the economic and social 
systems. 
 
Major institutional reforms were necessary for the final phase.  The creation of new 
supranational Community institutions was crucial, implying a revision of the Rome 
Treaties
22.  EMU revolved around two axes: first, a "Community Monetary System", like the 
Federal Reserve System in the United States, and, second, a kind of economic 
government, “of Community institutions endowed with the necessary powers to pursue a 
single economic policy”
23. Economic policy was defined as encompassing budgetary and 
                                                          
20   Contributions to the process of European monetary integration can also be considered in the light of three main roles 
assumed by policy-makers: (i) "providers" of influential ideas and concepts for the overall design of the EMU project, 
which were instrumental in pushing the process ahead; (ii) "policy entrepreneurs", who put forward concrete proposals to 
provide a new impetus to the process; (iii) "skilful negotiators" who helped to achieve successful outcomes in key 
episodes of the process. 
21  "Un plan de solidarité monétaire européenne en trois étapes 1971-1977" (Ministère des Finances, 1970). 
22  In this respect there was a clear difference in comparison with the French position of 1970, as Pompidou was against the 
creation of supranational European institutions. 
23   "d'organes communautaires dotés des pouvoirs requis pour la poursuite d'une politique économique unique".  
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income policies. For budgetary policy, the new Community institutions would establish the 
general framework within which the Member States had to conduct their budgetary policy.  
Moreover, the Community budget should gradually gain in importance. 
 
When later on, during the Maastricht Treaty negotiations, the idea of a “gouvernement 
économique” was launched by France and the Commission, the Belgian government gave 
its wholehearted support to it (Maystadt, 1998).  Greater decision-making power for the 
ECOFIN Council was regarded as important both to strengthen the economic side, and as 
a counterbalance to the monetary side, which was based on a unified monetary policy.  
However, the concept was not adopted under the Treaty. Economic policy remained in 
essence a national matter, leading to an asymmetric EMU
24.  But this debate contributed to 
Article 99 (ex article 103) of the Treaty, which provides for the annual Broad Economic 
Policy Guidelines of the Member States and the Community.   Also, the Belgian authorities 
had favoured a Maastricht Treaty with a stronger social dimension and, in order to remedy 
the democratic deficit, a stronger role for the European Parliament. 
 
4.1.2  Parallelism with a monetarist emphasis
25 
The "monetarist emphasis" in the Belgian integration strategy cannot be denied if this 
means that monetary cooperation and integration can act as a catalyst for economic 
convergence, and that there is therefore no need to wait for complete convergence to be 
attained, as "economists" would prefer (see, e.g., Ansiaux, 1970; Smets, Maes & 
Michielsen, 2000; Ungerer, 1997, 103).  
 
Exchange rate stability has been central to Belgium’s moves to promote European 
monetary cooperation.  The Belgian plan of 1970 proposed that, in the first stage, the 
fluctuation margins should be progressively reduced and that changes in parity could only 
be adopted by common agreement. 
                                                          
24   Senior German policy-makers admit that there was some contradiction in the German negotiation position, with Germany 
being against a "governement économique" but in favour of restraints on national budgetary policies.  Waigel's political 
problems in Bavaria were mentioned as an element in the explanation.  
25   The debate between the "monetarists" and the "economists" came clearly to the foreground in the Werner Committee, 
where there were heated discussions about the priorities on the path to EMU.  The "monetarists", with France as a 
dominant player, were in favour of plans for greater exchange rate stability and exchange rate support mechanisms.  
They saw a driving role for monetary integration in the process of European integration.  The "economists", under the 
leadership of Germany, emphasised the coordination of economic policies and the convergence of economic 
performances, especially inflation, as a precondition for EMU.  According to their view, the so-called coronation theory, 
monetary union could only be the last and crowning phase in the process of economic integration  
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A second area in which Belgium has been active - and one which is closely related to 
exchange rate cooperation - pertains to the mechanisms of monetary solidarity (official 
credit and settlement facilities).  The basic idea was that such mechanisms not only 
promoted mutual monetary cooperation, but - by showing a collective stance - were also a 
more efficient way of averting currency speculation than isolated national measures. 
 
As chairman of the expert committee of the Werner group, the then governor of the 
National Bank of Belgium, Hubert Ansiaux, left his mark on the proposals designed to 
elaborate mutual support mechanisms (Werner, 1991, 24).  Belgium later favoured 
granting the European Fund for Monetary Cooperation (EFMC) sufficient powers and 
resources to allow a real coordination of  monetary policy from the very outset 
(Vlerick, 1974, 13)
26.  At the time of the EMS, the Belgian representatives continued to 
focus on strengthening the Community credit mechanisms.  
 
Belgium's "monetarist" orientation also came to the fore during the Maastricht Treaty 
negotiations, when the Belgian government pressed for the inclusion of deadlines in the 
Treaty, in order not only to ensure definite action in the process of deciding on the 
launching of EMU, but also to provide a catalyst for meeting the convergence criteria. 
 
Although it took this "monetarist" view, Belgium joined the consensus on the need for 
parallel progress in the economic and monetary areas (de Strycker, 1970, 21). Apart from 
parallelism as a compromise solution, the Belgian authorities  were convinced that 
monetary cooperation was not sustainable without sound economic fundamentals and 
economic convergence.  Coordination of economic policy had to make a contribution in 
this respect, not only by recommending suitable policy measures to Member States, but 
also by enhancing their effectiveness through the mutual coordination of national 
measures.   
 
When, in November 1995, Germany proposed a “Stability Pact for Europe”, Belgium 
immediately reacted positively.  However, the Belgian finance minister, Philippe Maystadt, 
also stressed the need to supplement the budgetary stability pact by a “monetary stability 
pact”.  This would focus on the exchange rates between the single currency area and the 
other Member States of the EU (Maystadt, 1996, 10).  Here he was drawing on an old and 
fundamental Belgian idea, namely that exchange rate stability is important in a single 
                                                          
26  The European Monetary Cooperation Fund was established in 1973 by the central banks of the Member States taking 
part in the Snake.  
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market.  Moreover, this could also help the convergence process in the other Member 
States.  The ensuing discussions led to the creation of a new exchange rate mechanism, 
the so-called ERM2 (Brouhns, 1997, 53). 
 
4.1.3  Scope for a multi-speed Europe 
The concept of a multi-speed Europe was controversial and highly sensitive.  The official 
debate on this strategy was triggered by the Tindemans R eport, submitted at the 
December 1975 European Council. 
 
The Tindemans Report was written at a time when, in view of increasing economic and 
monetary divergences within the Community, the atmosphere was not right for relaunching 
EMU.  It defined for the first time the elements of a multi-speed integration. Member States 
that were in a position to make progress had to be able to do so without waiting for the 
ones which were lagging behind (Tindemans, 1976, 27).  The latter would receive the 
necessary assistance and be judged on their performance by the competent Community 
institutions with a view to catching up.  The Snake was to provide the primary framework 
here, becoming the pivot of the new strategy subject to greater co-ordination of economic 
and monetary policy (Rey, 1994, 32). 
 
Such a two- or multi-speed strategy must not be confused with a Europe "à la carte" in 
which various countries would aim at various objectives.  The objectives remained the 
same for every country but could be achieved at varying rates.  In order to safeguard 
unified objectives, the process would have to continue within the Community's legal 
framework.  This also implied that the Community institutions should not be left out (as was 
the case for the Commission in the Snake), but should remain involved and exercise their 
powers. 
 
Initially, the idea of a multi-speed strategy was treated with quite widespread scepticism, 
because of fears that the Community would disintegrate.  Gradually, it gained more 
acceptance and was applied successfully in the EMS and the Maastricht Treaty 
(de Schoutheete, 1997, 105). 
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4.1.4  Concrete contributions  
Belgium also  provided several concrete contributions to the EMU process. The 
negotiations on the monetary dimension of the Single European Act in 1985 were a n 
important moment.  This was the first major revision of the Rome Treaties.  While EMU 
could not be an immediate objective, it was crucial that the Treaties should mention  the 
"acquis communautaire" in monetary matters (EMU as an aim of the Community, the EMS 
and the ecu).  Belgium carefully prepared its proposals, manoeuvred to prevent  the 
Commission becoming isolated, and negotiated hard  and tenaciously on this issue (de 
Ruyt, 1989).  At the time of the Delors Report, this would become a crucial stepping stone 
for further progress on EMU.   
 
Belgian officials also played an important role in brokering compromises and furthering 
consensus
27.  Belgian monetary diplomacy, often together with Luxembourg, was very 
much focused on stimulating a Franco-German  understanding which promoted the 
process of European integration.  When the Rome Treaty was being negotiated, the 
exchange rate was already a topic of turbulent debates.  According to Van Tichelen 
(1981, 340), one of the Belgian negotiators, one of the main points of disagreement was 
whether it should be a national or a Community competence.  The Belgian delegation, 
inspired by a Commonwealth formula, proposed that "Each Member State shall treat its 
policy with regard to exchange rates as a matter of common interest".  It was an 
ambiguous formula, but it succeeded in placing the exchange rate in the area of 
competence of the Community.  A further example was the Belgian contribution to the 
preparations for the EMS when Belgium was chairing both the Monetary Committee and 
the Committee of Central Bank Governors (Ludlow, 1982, 165).  The Belgian idea of the 
"divergence indicator" opened the way for an agreement on the EMS resolution of 
December 1978, even if the instrument was subsequently hardly used.  Another example 
is the Belgian proposal, during the intergovernmental conference on the Maastricht Treaty, 
to call the new institution of the second stage, the "European Monetary Institute" 
(Schönfelder and Thiel, 1996, 132).  It was instrumental in bridging the  differences 
between France, proposing the creation of the European Central Bank, and Germany, in 
favour of a "Council of Presidents of Central Banks".   
 
                                                          
27   Coming from a small country, Belgian policy-makers have been obliged to take greater account of the point of view of the 
other players.  Moreover, living in a multicultural and multilingual country, they were also much more used to negotiating 
with persons from a different background.  
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Later, in the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty, Belgium played a creative and 
pace-setting role in the preparations for the euro scenario, as approved at the Madrid 
Summit of December 1995 (Smets, Michielsen & Maes, 2002).  In the summer of 1996, 
Belgium further adopted a "Schéma national de la place", which contained the main lines 
for the transition to the euro for the financial sector.  It was also decided to create a 
"General Commission for the Euro", in charge of encouraging  and coordinating the 
changeover to the euro.  This allowed Belgium to play a creative and pace-setting role in 
the preparations for the so-called cash changeover, as is clearly apparent in the 
Commission’s  "Report on the Preparations for the Introduction of the Euro Notes and 
Coins" (CEC, 2001).  
 
4.2  Italy 
While Italy has been consistently in favour of a supranational EMU, its role on the 
European monetary scene has changed over  time.  The heyday was  in  the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, when Italian policy-makers played an important pace-setting role in the 
EMU process. 
 
4.2.1  A supranational EMU 
A constant feature of the Italian approach to European monetary integration  – and to 
European integration in general  - has been a supranational vision.  Already at the time of 
the Werner Report, Colombo, the Italian finance minister and a convinced European 
federalist, was in favour of substantial progress towards EMU.   
 
At the Ecofin meeting of 23 and 24 February 1970, Colombo structured his presentation in 
accordance with the Belgian plan.  Generally, he was in agreement with it: "We agree 
broadly with the analysis and assessment in that plan"
28.  In particular, he agreed with the 
creation of Community institutions which would become responsible for a unified economic 
policy and a European Federal Reserve System, also stressing that this presupposed a 
step in the political organisation of the European Community. 
                                                          
28   "Noi concordiamo largamento con l'analisi e la valutazione in detto piano" (Colombo, 1970, 236).  The text of Colombo's 
intervention was published in Bancaria (Colombo, 1970).  
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4.2.2  From an ‘economist’ to a ‘monetarist’ approach 
As for the road to EMU, according to several observers, Italy initially tended towards an 
"economist" position.  For example, Tsoukalis situates Italy with Germany and the 
Netherlands, pointing out that the Italian authorities opposed the introduction of the EMCF 
(Tsoukalis 1977, 97, 109).  Werner, in contrast, considered Stammati, the Director-General 
of the Italian Treasury and the Italian member of his Committee, as one of the members of 
the monetarist group (Werner, 1991, 124)
29.   
 
Guido Carli, the Governor of the Banca d'Italia, clearly took economist positions.  In an 
article published in Euromoney in 1970, he espoused the coronation theory, arguing that 
the creation of a European currency should be "the culminating act of a sequence through 
which political and economic unification were achieved".  Also, in a paper for 
Jean Monnet's Action Committee for the United States of Europe, Carli had previously 
taken a cautious approach, stressing the need for economic convergence and advocating 
a gradual approach, based on a "crawling peg" (Carli, 1969)
30.   
 
At the Ecofin meeting of 23 and 24 February 1970, according to the Belgian minutes, the 
position of Italy was "full of nuances" and tended towards the centre, between Belgium, 
Luxembourg and France, the "unrepentant optimists", and Germany and the Netherlands, 
characterised by a "positive cautiousness" (Note X/CEE/620/34160, 26/2/1970, Archives 
Snoy, Map 5.3.12.8.2).   
 
 
Table 3 - Positions at the time of the Hague Summit 
 
A supranational EMU  Monetary 
cooperation in the 
first stage  Reluctant  Cautiously positive  Favourable 
Reluctant   
Germany 
Netherlands 
Italy 
Favourable  France   
Belgium 
Luxembourg 
 
 
                                                          
29   Naturally, one can ask the question whether it was a coincidence that Stammati, who was close to Colombo, became the 
Italian member of the Werner Committee. 
30   Carli (1993, 227) described his paper as "rather different" (assai diverso) from the Werner Plan.  Carli also wanted to 
avoid that the United Kingdom would not be able to participate in the EMU project or that a strengthening of European 
integration would be at the expense of the relations with the United States (Carli, 1993, 228 and 230).  
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Italy's position was certainly complex and subtle (see also Segreto, 2002).  Part of the 
explanation is that it favoured an economic and monetary union with strong supranational 
institutions, as  did Belgium and Luxembourg, a  stance which was in line with Italy's 
traditional position on European integration.  But, at the same time, Italy and especially 
Carli, the Governor of Banca d'Italia, was more cautious and reserved towards immediate 
concrete initiatives, as were Germany and the Netherlands (cf. Table 3). 
 
At the Ecofin meeting of 23 and 24 February 1970, Colombo, the Italian finance minister, 
was cautious, but also very subtle, about the transitional phases.  He was rather reluctant 
about the idea of narrowing exchange rate fluctuation margins, given the differences in 
economic policies.  However, he also warned that a widening of the fluctuation margins 
could not be compatible with the functioning of the Community, especially the Common 
Agricultural Policy (Colombo, 1970, 237).  He also argued strongly in favour of considering 
a crawling peg system, an earlier proposal by Carli.  However, Colombo could envisage a 
European Reserve Fund, especially for medium-term operations.   
 
The debates on European monetary integration in Italy were rekindled in 1978, when the 
creation of the EMS was being discussed.  Some Italian policy-makers, in particular at the 
Bank of Italy, feared that the exchange rate system would not be supported by sufficiently 
convergent economic policies.  If so, the lira would have to leave the ERM, as happened 
with the snake.  They pointed out that the EMS needed some "in-built flexibility" to take 
into account Italy’s "special conditions" (Baffi, 1989).  Italian policy-makers further 
supported more symmetric monetary arrangements.  After Italy’s experience with the 
"asymmetric" Snake, Italian policy-makers, pleaded for a more "symmetric" EMS, as well 
as some flexibility in the system (Masera, 1987a).  During the negotiations, they advocated 
three main points: i) wider fluctuation bands; ii) the indicator of divergence; and iii) parallel 
measures for the less prosperous economies, although this was regarded as less 
important. 
 
From the early 1980s, Italian policy-makers clearly sided with the monetarist group, 
together with France, Belgium and the Commission.  The participation in the exchange 
rate mechanism of the EMS in 1979, marked a turning point.  Moreover, Governor Ciampi 
and some of his closest aides, such as Padoa-Schioppa, became strongly in favour of 
exchange rate cooperation within the EU and of Italian membership of the EMS
31.  They 
                                                          
31   For a comparison of the monetary policy of Carli, Baffi and Ciampi, see Panico, 1998, 155.  
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also favoured an institutional development of the EMS, with the creation of a European 
Monetary Fund in a second phase.  
 
Italy's growing assertiveness in European monetary matters was clearly in evidence in  the 
Amato memorandum, in which the asymmetric functioning of the ERM was brought to the 
fore
32.  The Amato memorandum argued that the fundamental problem of the EMS was the 
lack of an "engine of growth".  The argument went that the EMS had an in-built deflationary 
bias, as the German Mark was undervalued and German domestic demand was lower 
than the EU average. This created a surplus on the German current account and reduced 
the growth potential in the other EMS countries. According to the memorandum, the 
system should single out the divergent countries in both directions and all countries should 
share the burden of adjustment.   
 
The Amato memorandum also called for an "institutional phase" of the EMS.  The first 
concrete step would be to strengthen the functions of the EMCF by creating a mechanism 
for collecting and recycling funds in the market to compensate for capital movements 
resulting from capital liberalisation in the EU.  It also proposed a common policy vis-à-vis 
third country currencies and an increased role for the ECU in exchange rate interventions. 
Ultimately, EMU was seen as a way to address, the asymmetric functioning of the EMS 
and to have a say in European monetary policy (Amato, 1988). 
 
Italy's monetarist approach also came to the fore in Ciampi's contribution to the Delors 
Report, with a proposal for an institutional scheme for a common monetary policy (Ciampi, 
1989).  The aim was to establish a framework to ensure that the differing national 
monetary policies would be operationally merged into one policy.   
 
Later, throughout the negotiations for the Maastricht Treaty, the adequacy of the 
institutional arrangements for the transitional stage to EMU and, in particular, for the stage 
two institution, were cause for constant concern for the Italian negotiators.  Thus, the Bank 
of Italy issued a paper "The functions of the European central bank in the second phase of 
EMU", while a joint paper by the Bank and the Ministry of Finance outlined "A blueprint for 
stage two of EMU". 
 
                                                          
32  In February 1988 Giuliano Amato, Treasury Minister, sent a memorandum to his ECOFIN colleagues under the title of 
"An Engine of Growth for the EMS" (Amato, 1988).  
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4.2.3  Concrete contributions  
Contributions by Italian policy-makers to EU negotiations, and their pro-active stance in 
key episodes, tended to be concentrated in the 1980s and early 1990s, the period when 
Italy participated in the ERM. 
 
Initially, Italian policy-makers sought to improve the functioning of the EMS.  Thus, the 
Italian authorities supported the Commission’s attempts to improve the functioning of the 
EMS in the early 1980s
33.  Likewise, as long as monetary union seemed impracticable at 
the official level, Italian policy-makers turned to the market in an attempt to further the 
process of monetary integration, and proposed an increased role for the ecu, in particular 
the private ecu (Padoa-Schioppa, 1992, XVIII, Masera, 1987b, Amato, 1988)
34.  
 
Italian policy-makers played an important role in the relaunching of the EMU process in the 
second half of the 1980s and in the negotiations concerning the Maastricht Treaty.  An 
example is the role of Padoa-Schioppa as the co-rapporteur of the Delors Committee, 
which provided the blueprint for the EMU negotiations. Padoa-Schioppa played a major 
role in the drafting of the report (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999, 502).  A second example 
is the Italian Presidency of the EC in 1990 and how the agenda-setting powers and other 
prerogatives of the Presidency were used by Italian representatives.  The Conclusions of 
the Rome European Council of October 1990, which paved the way for the IGC, were very 
much the result of Italian diplomatic manoeuvring (Marshall, 1999, 354-55).  A third 
example was the proposal to set a final deadline for EMU in the TEU.  This provision was 
agreed at the last minute at the Maastricht European Council in December 1991, and 
Italian policy-makers are often credited with the idea (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999, 517-
18). 
 
4.3  Comparison 
Belgium and Italy b oth played an active role in the debate on European monetary 
integration in policy-makers' circles, be it to different degrees.  They advocated a 
supranational EMU and, typically, a monetarist approach towards it.  A major difference 
between the two countries was that the Belgian vision was developed in much more detail.  
                                                          
33   At that time Padoa-Schioppa was the Director General of DG II (Economic and Financial Affairs).  It is noteworthy that, 
until recently, the Director-General of DG II has always been an Italian (Maes, 1996). 
34   Belgian policy-makers were much more reluctant to support an increased role for the private ecu, as they feared that this 
could threaten the credibility of Belgium's exchange rate policy (Michielsen, 1986).  
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Moreover, the vision remained basically unchanged from the 1970s, when the first Belgian 
EMU plan was submitted, to the 1990s.  In Italy there was not such a uniform and coherent 
view throughout this period.  Italian policy-makers were mainly active during the 1980s and 
early 1990s.  They also tended to be more critical towards the German dominance of the 
EMS, as in the Amato Memorandum
35. 
                                                          
35   Belgian policy-makers had less reason to be critical, as the Belgian economy and business cycle were more in line with 
Germany’s.  Moreover, they were very well aware that criticism of the Bundesbank could be harmful to the credibility of 
the Belgian franc exchange rate policy.  
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5.  CONCLUSION 
This paper analyses and compares the role that Belgium and Italy have played in the EMU 
process.  Belgium and Italy were both founding Member States of the European 
Communities and shared a strongly pro-European attitude.  In EMU matters they favoured 
a supranational EMU.  Moreover, they typically belonged to the "monetarist" camp, 
pushing for closer monetary and exchange rate cooperation.  For both countries, exchange 
rate stability was important: to further the process of European integration, as an external 
constraint on domestic policies and as a crucial condition for securing influence on the 
European monetary scene. 
 
Overall, Belgium and Italy played a pace-setting role in the EMU process.  Belgian and 
Italian policy-makers contributed to several concepts and ideas which would be influential 
in the monetary integration process.  The "Plan Snoy", which contained a well-developed 
blueprint for EMU and the path towards it, proved to be very influential at the time of the 
Hague Summit and the Werner Committee.  The concept of a multi-speed Europe, as put 
forward in the Tindemans Report, was important to keep monetary integration on the 
agenda in the 1970s, and figured prominently in the Maastricht Treaty.  Italy presented 
proposals for expanding the role of the ECU, contributing to the development of the private 
ECU market.  Belgian and Italian policy-makers also acted as "policy entrepreneurs", 
putting forward concrete proposals.  A typical example was the Belgian idea of the 
"divergence indicator", which opened the way for an agreement on the EMS.  Ciampi, in 
his contribution to the Delors Report, developed a proposal for an institutional scheme for 
a common monetary policy.  Belgium played a creative role in the preparation of the euro 
scenario, adopted at the Madrid European Council in December 1995 and in the 
preparations for the so-called cash changeover.  Lastly, both the Belgians and the Italians 
were, at several instances, skilful negotiators.  With its proposal for a monetary dimension 
in the Single European Act, Belgium prevented the Commission from becoming isolated 
and thus from being compelled to withdraw on this issue.  Belgium also the proposed the 
name "European Monetary Institute", a compromise name for the institution for the second 
stage, acceptable to both France and Germany.  The Italian presidency succeeded in 
launching the IGC on EMU and giving it a broad agenda, outmanoeuvring Thatcher at the 
Rome European Council. 
 
However, there were also significant differences between Belgium and Italy.  Belgium has 
been a constant and consistent "pace-setter" in monetary matters, from the preparation of  
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the Hague Summit to the design of the EMS, the monetary chapter in the Single European 
Act and the realisation of EMU.  Its closest ally was the Commission, with which it shared 
the fundamental aim of a more integrated and federal Europe.  Italian policy-makers mainly 
played a role in the EMU process in the 1980s, with the Rome European Councils in 1990 
as a high point. 
 
To a large extent, these  divergences in the Belgian and Italian approaches can be 
explained by political, social and economic differences.  In Belgium it is difficult to find any 
significant divergence from the consensus on European integration and EMU.  The 
objective of a stable exchange rate policy was never seriously questioned. In Italy, there 
were at times ambivalent attitudes towards European integration.  For instance, before the 
"historic compromise" in the 1970s, the Italian Communist Party, the second largest party 
in those years, was reluctant about European integration. Furthermore, the Italian 
economy was less stable and the situation was often worsened by acute social tensions.  
Moreover, the objective of a stable exchange rate was often questioned in Italy. Indeed, 
there were serious discussions among Italian policy-makers as to the wisdom of 
participating in European exchange rate mechanisms, as the Italian economy had 
recurring difficulties with high inflation and balance of payment deficits.  
 
On a more general level, the study shows the importance of a stable exchange rate during 
the process of European monetary integration.  From a domestic point of view, a stable 
exchange rate has played a crucial role as a disciplining device, a "vincolo esterno".  
Moreover, from an external point of view, a stable exchange rate was crucial in order to 
have influence on the European monetary scene and in the design of the EMU project.  
With its stable exchange rate policy, Belgium therefore was a continuous pace-setter in 
EMU matters, while Italy was mainly influential in the 1980s and in the early 1990s, when 
the lira was in the ERM.  This also shows the fundamental changes which EMU implies.  
The exchange rate as a disciplinary device has been replaced by a new economic policy 
regime based on close coordination of economic policies.  Moreover, the disappearance of 
exchange rates in the euro area marks an important change in the determinants of 
influence on the European monetary scene.  
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ANNEX – Governments’ attributes in the European Union 
 
Types of government (a) 
Countries 
Maj.  Coa.  Min. 
Government 
durability (b) 
Political stability 
(c) 
Austria  39.0  58.5  2.4  2.67  40.0 
Belgium  9.8  90.2  0.0  1.43  10.0 
Denmark  0.0  34.1  65.9  2.11  5.7 
France  41.5  39.0  19.5  1.29  2.5 
Germany  9.6  90.0  0.0  2.00  20.0 
Greece (d)  91.2  5.9  2.9  0.97  4.0 
Ireland  65.9  24.4  9.8  1.90  5.0 
Italy  0.0  95.1  4.9  0.95  10.0 
Netherlands   0.0  100.0  0.0  3.33  6.7 
Portugal (e)  26.7  53.3  20.0  1.48  5.0 
Spain (f)  50.0  35.7  14.3  2.00  20.0 
UK  92.7  0.0  7.3  4.00  8.0 
 
(a)  Maj. = single party majority, Coa. = coalition majority, Min. = Minority (coalition or single party).   
  The number in each column refers to the percentage of years in which the government was of each of the three types, 
out of the years of democratic regime between 1950 and 1990.  The type is defined with reference to the lower house. 
(b)  Durability of the executive between 1950 and 1990 (average number of years). 
(c)  Average number of years between "significant" government changes in the period 1950-89. 
(d)  Dictatorship between 1967 an 1973. 
(e)  Dictatorship until 1973.  New democratic constitution in 1976. 
(f)  Dictatorship until 1974.  First democratic election in 1977. 
 
Source: Grilli, Masciandaro & Tabellini, 1991, 365. 
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